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Abstract 
 This paper seeks to critically analyse the requirements of the 
duty imposed on directors to act for a proper purpose as 
provided in section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act (Companies Act 71 
of 2008) whenever they distribute company money and/or 
property. This analysis is conducted with the obligations 
imposed under sections 4 and 46 of the 2008 Act in mind. The 
purpose is not to question the inclusion of this duty in the 2008 
Act. It is simply to question whether the common law 
interpretation of the duty still suffices in the face of section 76(3) 
of the 2008 Act, which seems to suggest that a different standard 
of judgment must be used. The argument that is made here is 
that the use of common law principles in interpreting proper 
purpose is well and good when the actions of directors are 
challenged based on the common law, but, where this duty has 
been incorporated into statutory law the interpretation of the duty 
in the context of the wording of the statute should be paramount. 
In addition, when interpreting any provision of the Act, 
consideration of the objects of the statute becomes inevitable. 
The interpretation of the duty cannot, in the face of the changes 
brought about by the statute, remain stagnant as a result of 
reliance on common law standards of judgment. The wording of 
the provision in question and the purpose of the statute cannot 
and must not be ignored; they must be given effect. A 
comparative approach will be adopted, using legislation and 
case law from Australia and Canada. The selection of these 
particular jurisdictions is based solely on the fact that like South 
Africa, their legal heritage is based on English common law, and 
a comparison of the three jurisdictions therefore makes sense. 
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1 Introduction 
In its endeavours to change the long-standing common law position on 
company law, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter "the 2008 Act")1 
has partially codified the duty to act for a proper purpose. Looked at through 
the lens of the provisions regulating the distribution of company money 
and/or property, its purpose, as described in the overall objects of the Act in 
section 7 is to preserve the existence of companies as vehicles to do 
business but also to reaffirm the concept of a company as a means to 
achieving economic and social benefits. These were the policy directives 
issued by the South African government in its 2004 policy paper, which have 
been transfused into the 2008 Act.2 Section 5(1) of the 2008 Act enjoins our 
courts to interpret and apply the provisions of the Act in a manner which 
gives effect to the purposes set out in section 7.3 The latter statement 
suggests that whenever disputes pertaining to the distribution of company 
                                            
*  Simphiwe S Bidie. LLB LLM LLD (UFH). Lecturer, Nelson R Mandela School of Law, 
University of Fort Hare, South Africa. E-mail: sbidie@ufh.ac.za. This is a revised 
version of a paper which I presented at the Fourth Annual International Mercantile 
Law Conference, at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa on 
1-3 November 2017. I wish to acknowledge the assistance provided by Prof PC 
Osode in editing this paper. Any errors of reference and/or omissions in this paper 
are mine alone. 
1  The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the 2008 Act) was assented to by the President 
on 9 April 2009. The Act came into operation on 1 May 2011 (Proc 32 in GG 
34239 of 26 April 2011). The 2008 Act amended the Companies Act 61 of 1973. S 
224 provides for the partial repeal of the 1973 Act. 
2  See s 7(d) and (e) of the 2008 Act. Furthermore, and as far as is relevant, this section 
states that the purposes of the Act are to: "(a) promote compliance with the Bill of 
Rights; (b)(i) and (iii) encourage enterprise efficiency and high standards of 
corporate governance, given the significant role of enterprises within the social and 
economic life of the nation respectively; (e) use of companies in a manner that 
enhances the economic welfare of South Africa; (i) balance the rights and obligations 
of shareholders and directors within companies; (j) encourage efficient and 
responsible management of companies; and (l) to provide a predictable and efficient 
and effective environment for the efficient regulation of companies". These 
objectives cannot be ignored in interpreting any provision. Nedbank Ltd v The 
National Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 581 (SCA) para 2. According to the 2004 South 
African government-issued policy paper entitled "South African Company Law for 
the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform" (hereinafter referred to as 
"Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform") "Old concepts have been modified or 
abandoned or new ones have come to the fore informed by the globalised 
environment within which companies operate, increased innovation in electronic 
interaction, as well as greater sensitivity to societal and ethical concerns, and greater 
competition for capital, goods and services." See Gen N 1183 in GG 26493 of 23 
June 2004. Also see Henning 2010 Acta Juridica 456, Knight 2010 Acta Juridica 2. 
3  Quite apart from the South African position, in the UK s170(4) of the Companies Act, 
2006 provides that the general duties are to be interpreted and applied in the same 
way as common law rules or equitable principles, and regard should be had to the 
corresponding rules and equitable principles in interpreting and applying the general 
rules. Eclairs Group Ltd and Glengary Overseas v JKX Oil & Gas plc 2015 WLR (D) 
497 para 14 (hereinafter "Eclairs Group Ltd"). 
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money or property or related to how directors perform their duties in relation 
to the company in question are brought before our courts, the courts have 
the responsibility to ensure that the performance of those duties is 
interpreted in the context of fulfilling the purposes/objects of the Act as set 
out in section 7. 
Rules pertaining to the distribution of company money or property serve an 
important role as one of the mechanisms used by the 2008 Act to achieve 
that which it envisages under section 7 of the Act, that is, to preserve the 
existence of companies, but also to reaffirm the concept of a company as a 
means to achieving economic and social benefits. Thus, one of the cardinal 
purposes of the distribution rules is to ensure that the company is managed 
judiciously.4 These rules impose obligations on directors and as such must 
be observed, based on the duties of directors as provided under section 
76(3) of the 2008 Act. One of the duties under section 76(3) which directors 
must perform when acting in that capacity is to exercise their powers and 
perform their functions for a proper purpose.5 
Previously, prohibitions against directors' actions in the realm of improper 
purpose were to the effect that directors may not distribute assets of the 
company among its redundant employees for the sole purpose of treating 
employees generously, other than the members,6 or to issue shares or 
refuse to do so for an improper purpose, or contravene common law rules 
by paying dividends out of capital,7 for example, unless they honestly 
                                            
4  To ensure that this is achieved, the 2008 Act sought to strengthen the rules relating 
to the distribution of company money or property. Changes to the distribution rules 
were first brought about by the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. The 
Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999 was signed into law on 14 April 1999 and 
was published as GN 515 in GG 19983 of 30 April 1999. Currently these rules are 
regulated under the 2008 Act. As the main controlling measure against the demise 
of a company, both pieces of legislation introduced the solvency and liquidity test 
and a number of procedures which must be followed before a distribution is made. 
These were first introduced under ss 85(4) and 90(2) of the 1973 Act, and are now 
set out under s 4 of the 2008 Act. Currently this test operates in conjunction with the 
procedural requirements under s 46. 
5  See s 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
6  Other factors would include cases where the director causes the company to 
guarantee his or her' indebtedness or to discount a bill of exchange in favour of the 
company for the directors' private use; and where the director pays a cheque drawn 
in favour of the company into his personal banking account and misappropriates the 
proceeds of the cheque. Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 298(2). 
Also see Parke v Daily News Ltd 1962 Ch 927; and Hutton v West Cork Railway Co 
1883 23 Ch D 654 CA 671. 
7  Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 389; In Re Exchange Banking Co; 
Flitcroft's Case 1882 21 Ch 519 (CA) 533-534, 535; In re Sharpe 1892 1 Ch 154 
(CA) 165-166; In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co (2) 1896 1 Ch 331 347-348; In re 
Duomatic Ltd 1969 2 Ch 365 374-375; Jacobson v Liquidator M Bulkin & Co Ltd 
1976 3 SA 781 (T) 790-791. 
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believed that there were profits for distribution at the time.8 In interpreting 
the rules pertaining to improper purpose practically the challenge was that 
divergent views persisted as to which standard of judgment should be used 
to determine whether an improper purpose existed in the circumstances of 
a particular case.9 The standards of judgment applied by courts varied from 
a "causative test" to a "subjective test", a "primary purpose test" and an 
"objective test".10 Judging from case law, in the process to determine 
whether directors acted for a proper purpose, courts in the different 
jurisdictions considered in this paper seem to be in tune with one another in 
the application of the "primary purpose test", the "dominant test" and the 
"causative test" to ascertain whether indeed the power conferred was 
exercised for a proper purpose. However, on further perusal of the 
contemporary jurisprudence and/or commentaries on the subject of proper 
purpose, one senses that the approach differs markedly on which standard 
to apply, whether subjective or objective or both. The difference seems to 
arise from the fact that the existing statutes do not attempt to define what 
proper purpose entails. As a result, for the purpose of decision making on 
the subject, the absence of a definition has suggested to commentators and 
the courts alike that the common law jurisprudence which over the years 
has informed its interpretation is still relevant, especially as some 
jurisdictions have more or less absorbed the common law position into their 
statutory frameworks. Some countries, such as South Africa, have codified 
directors' duties into their company law legislation, and have also statutorily 
provided that common law rules still apply to determine director liability.11 
Looking at case law in the South African context, the courts seem not to be 
of one mind as to which standard of judgment is contemplated under the 
2008 Act. Some courts still favour an interpretation of the statutorily 
expressed duty of proper purpose by using only the common law objective 
standard of judgment. This may be justified because the duties in the 2008 
Act are those applied at common law. However, the problem with 
approaching the interpretation of this duty in terms of common law principles 
only is that it stands to dilute the policy direction adopted by the Act currently 
in operation, especially if the Act in question contemplates charting a 
different course by imposing a higher standard of judgement than was the 
case at common law. The interpretative possibility is an adoption of a 
standard completely unintended by the express provisions of the Act.  
                                            
8  Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 389. 
9  See Fridman 1980 Bond LR 165. 
10  See a discussion of the operation of different tests in Langford and Ramsay 2015 
JBL 173-182. 
11  See s 77(2)(a) and (b) of the 2008 Act. 
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This paper seeks to critically analyse the requirements of the duty imposed 
on directors12 to act for a proper purpose as provided in section 76(3)(a) of 
the 2008 Act whenever they distribute company money and/or property.13 
This analysis is conducted with the obligations imposed under sections 4 
and 46 of the 2008 Act in mind. The purpose is not to question the inclusion 
of this duty in the 2008 Act. It is simply to question whether common law 
interpretation of the duty still suffice in the face of section 76(3) of the 2008 
Act, which seems to suggest that a different standard of judgment must be 
used. The argument that is sought to be made here is that the use of 
common law principles in interpreting proper purpose is well and good when 
the actions of directors are challenged based on the common law, but, 
where this duty has been incorporated into statutory law the interpretation 
of the duty in the context of the wording of the statute should be paramount. 
In addition, when interpreting any provision of the statute, consideration of 
its objects becomes inevitable. The interpretation of the duty cannot, in the 
face of the changes brought about by the statute, remain stagnant by 
continued reliance on common law standards of judgment. Therefore, the 
wording of the provision in question and the purpose of the statute cannot 
and must not be ignored; they must be given effect. A comparative approach 
is adopted, using legislation and case law from Australia and Canada as 
poles of comparison. These two jurisdictions are selected solely because 
like South Africa their legal heritage is based on English common law, and 
a comparison of the three jurisdictions therefore makes sense. 
2 Duty to act for a proper purpose 
The duty to act for a proper purpose attaches to the exercise of powers 
conferred on directors, be they acting collectively or individually. The duty is 
                                            
12  Section 76(1) defines a director to include an alternate director and a prescribed 
officer, or a person who is a member of a committee of a board of a company, or of 
the audit committee of a company, irrespective of whether or not the person is also 
a member of the company's board. In section 1 a director means a member of the 
board of a company, as contemplated in s 66, or an alternate director of a company 
and includes any person occupying the position of a director or alternate director, by 
whatever name designated. An alternate director is defined as a person elected or 
appointed to serve, as the occasion requires, as a member of the board of a 
company in substitution for a particular elected or appointed director of that 
company. 
13  See s 66(1) of the 2008 Act and s 102 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, 
1985 (the CBCA), which gives directors the power to make decisions. Where a 
director is appointed with authority to manage the affairs of the company, the director 
becomes the agent of the company, hence he/she stands in a fiduciary relationship. 
Visser et al South African Mercantile and Company Law 350; Regal (Hastings) Ltd 
v Gulliver 1942 1 All ER 378 (HL); and Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining 
Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 217, 218. 
SS BIDIE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  6 
fiduciary in nature.14 Previously the duties of directors were regulated by 
common law15 informed by principles from equity.16 The UK Supreme Court 
in Eclairs Group Ltd17 expressed the fundamental nature of the 
responsibilities of directors to act for a proper purpose as follows: 
The rule that the fiduciary powers of directors may be exercised only for the 
purpose for which they were conferred is one of the main means by which 
equity enforces the proper conduct of directors. It is also fundamental to the 
constitutional distinction between the respective domains of the board and the 
shareholders. 
From this narrow statement it can be gleaned that at common law it was 
important for directors not to overstep the bounds of the power which was 
conferred on them by the shareholders of the company through the 
company's constitution. In South African company law, directors' duties 
were not codified under the 1973 Act.18 The policy direction under the 2008 
Act has changed, resulting in the duties being codified at a fairly high level.19 
Under the 2008 Act the duty to act for a proper purpose is fused together 
with the duty of good faith and is regulated in terms of section 76(3)(a).20 
Additional to the duty to act for a proper purpose is the duty to “act in the 
best interests of the company" as well as with "care, skill and diligence" as 
regulated in sections 76(3)(b) and 76(3)(c) of the 2008 Act. As will be argued 
below, under the 2008 Act these duties are meant to operate cumulatively 
as the operation of one seems embedded in the operation of the other. 
Furthermore, one's intuition is raised where the duty to act for a proper 
purpose is not expressly required to be complied with in order for a director 
to earn protection under the business judgment rule as provided under 
section 76(4) of the 2008 Act. But, the duties regulated under sections 
                                            
14  According to Nolan, proper purpose is the least discussed and least understood of 
the directors' fiduciary duties. See Nolan "Proper Purpose Doctrine and Company 
Directors" 1; and Tjio 2016 LMCLQ 176-185. 
15  Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 290(4). 
16  Eclairs Group Ltd para 14; and Balls v Strutt 1841 Hare 146. 
17  Eclairs Group Ltd para 37. Also see the discussion of the case in Langford and 
Ramsay 2017 MLR 110-120. 
18  However, common law is not excluded and may still apply in some instances. Delport 
et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 290(4); and Mthimunye-Bakoro v 
Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Limited 2015 6 SA 338 
(WCC) (hereinafter "Mthimunye-Bakoro"); Coetzee and Van Tonder 2016 JJS 1-13; 
Havenga 2013 TSAR 257-268. 
19  Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) 2014 5 SA 179 (WCC) para 
58 (hereinafter "Visser"). 
20  In the UK this duty is contained in s 171(b) of the Companies Act, 2006; Madoff 
Securities International Ltd v Raven 2013 EWHC 3147 (Comm), before Popplewell 
J para 194 (hereinafter "Madoff"). The heading to s 171 is: "duty to act within 
powers". S171(b) states that: "a director of a company must only exercise powers 
for the purposes for which they are conferred". 
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76(3)(b) and (76(3)(c) are provided.21 Nevertheless, on proper analysis one 
may safely submit that taken together these duties seem to be inseparable, 
as it is inconceivable that the 2008 Act may require a director to act for a 
proper purpose without doing so in the best interest of the company and 
with care, skill and diligence. 
Under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 the duty to act for a proper 
purpose is contained in sections 181(1)(b) and 180(2)(a). Under section 
180(2)(a) the duty forms part of the satisfaction of the business judgment 
rule. It states that "a director or officer of a corporation who makes a 
business judgment is taken to meet the requirements of subsection (1), and 
their equivalent duties at common law and equity, in respect of the business 
judgment rule, if they make the judgment in good faith for a proper 
purpose".22 Under section 181(1)(b) "a director or other officer of a 
corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their duties for a 
proper purpose." 
Under the Canada Business Corporations Act, 1985 (hereinafter "the 
CBCA") the duty to act for a proper purpose is not included. Rather the Act 
emphasis the phrase "to the best interests of the company" in sections 
122(1)(a),23 fusing it with the duty to act honestly and in good faith. Under 
the Corporations Act the phrase "in the best interests of the company" is 
regulated in section 181(1)(a) together with the duty of good faith. The 
section reads "a director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their 
                                            
21  Section 76(4)(a) of the 2008 Act states that: "in respect of any particular matter 
arising in the exercise of the powers or the performance of the functions of director, 
a particular director of a company will have satisfied the obligations of subsection 
(3)(b) and (c) if…". 
22  Subsection (1) basically refers to s 180(1), which states that "a director or other 
officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their duties with 
the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they: (a) 
were a director or officer of a corporation in the corporation's circumstances, and (b) 
occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the corporation 
as, the director or officer". In the United Kingdom the duty in contained in s 172(1) of 
the Companies Act, 2006. It requires directors to act in a way they consider, in good 
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of 
its members as a whole. 
23  The section provides that every director and officer of a corporation in exercising 
their powers and discharging their duties shall, act honestly and in good faith with a 
view to the best interests of the corporation, and shall exercise the care, diligence 
and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable 
circumstances. Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise 2004 3 SCR 461 
para 32 (hereinafter "Peoples"); and BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders 2008 3 SCR 
560 para 36. 
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powers and discharge their duties in good faith in the best interests of the 
corporation".24 
3 Assessment of legal principles on the duty of proper 
purpose 
As will appear, the Australian, Canadian and UK courts have over the years 
applied the same principles as the South African courts when determining 
whether directors acted for a proper purpose. The difference, however, has 
been in the preferred standard of judgment to be used in determining 
whether a director acted for a proper purpose. Commentators agree that the 
presence of the duty to act for a proper purpose under section 76(3)(a) of 
the 2008 Act confirms the position under common law, but in addition 
removes any doubts as to the existence of the duty and makes it distinct 
from that of good faith.25 According to Cassim et al the setting out of this 
duty distinctly confirms the foundations of its legal principles, that in effect it 
has been used by the courts as an attempt to restrain the exercise by 
directors of the discretionary powers that they possess.26 This was so 
because the nature of the application of the power is that its exercise often 
leads to prejudice to another party.27  
The words "for a proper purpose" are not defined under any of the statutes 
considered here. It is submitted that literally construed the duty to exercise 
one's powers for a proper purpose provides two connotations: (i) that, in 
addition to acting honestly and in good faith, a director must also exercise 
his/her power for the purpose for which it was conferred and not for ulterior 
motives; and (ii) it also could assert that directors must not act beyond their 
powers, which is a principle used to control power conferred on public 
officials under administrative law. The understanding here is that when 
directors conduct the affairs of the company they are expected to do so 
within the confines of the conferred powers and for a rational purpose.28 
Cassim et al confirms that the first connotation constitutes what the duty has 
always been taken to mean at common law.29 This duty is distinct from the 
                                            
24  See the discussion of the business judgment rule in Kilian 2007 
http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2007/2007CK_ODPPNPSA
CA.pdf. Also see Jones 2007 SA Merc LJ 326-336. 
25  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 526. 
26  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 526. 
27  Visser para 81. 
28  In the absence of rationality, courts are permitted to invalidate any decision which 
directors have taken where their motivational purpose seems to the court as one 
beyond the powers which should have legitimately been exercised. Also see Kilian 
2007 
http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2007/2007CK_ODPPNPSA
CA.pdf. 
29  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 526. 
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duty of good faith, but they operate cumulatively such that a director who 
may have acted in good faith can be found to have not exercised his powers 
for a proper purpose.30 In Visser the Western Cape High Court stated 
that: 
The position in South African law has always been that directors occupy a 
fiduciary position and as a result must exercise powers conferred on them in 
what they bona fide consider to be the best interests of the company, for the 
purpose for which the power was conferred, and within any limits which may 
be imposed for the exercise of the power.31 
In Visser the test for a proper purpose was said to be purely objective.32 In 
law it has been accepted as a useful starting point to determine whether the 
conferred power was used for a proper purpose. This was so because once 
it had been ascertained what the actual purpose for which the power was 
exercised, then that would assist to determine whether the actual purpose 
falls within the confines for which the power was conferred.33 
It is implied, as has been realised by the High Court in Visser, that the 
provision conferring the power calls for an interpretation which takes into 
account the instrument as a whole34 and other relevant factors. In giving 
effect to the approach, the court in Visser applied what seemed to be the 
"dominant purpose test". In its ruling the court inferred that in the context of 
decisions by directors, there is often a close relationship between the 
requirement that the power should be exercised for a proper purpose and 
the requirement that directors should act in what they consider to be the 
best interests of the company. To the court, the overarching purpose for 
which directors must exercise the powers conferred on them is the purpose 
of promoting the best interests of the company.35 
Approaching the interpretation of the duty for proper purpose from the 
context of the early Courts of Chancery on how the principle to act for a 
proper purpose was considered at the time, the court in Eclairs Group Ltd 
stated that: 
The early Court of Chancery attached the consequences of fraud to acts which 
were honest and unexceptionable at common law but unconscionable 
according to equitable principles. In particular, it set aside dispositions under 
                                            
30  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 526. 
31  Visser para 58. 
32  Visser para 80; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 526; and Kilian 2007 
http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2007/2007CK_ODPPNPSA
CA.pdf 16. Also see a brief, but useful depiction the case in le Roux and Mardon 
2014 De Rebus 40. Also see Jones 2007 SA Merc LJ 326-336. 
33  Visser para 80. 
34  Visser para 80. 
35  Visser para 80. 
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powers conferred by trust deeds if, although within the language conferring 
the power, they were outside the purpose for which they were conferred.36 
Referring to earlier cases on the subject heard much earlier, the court 
further stated that: 
… that the donee, the operator under the power, shall, at the time of the 
exercise of that power, and for any purpose for which it is used, act with good 
faith and sincerity, and with an entire and single view to the real purpose and 
object of the power, and not for the purpose of accommodating or carrying 
into effect any bye or sinister object (I mean sinister in the sense of its being 
beyond the purpose and intent of the power) which he may desire to effect in 
the exercise of the power.37 
Viewed in the context of the ruling of the court, one may deduce that the 
principle of proper purpose had nothing to do with fraud in the common law 
meaning of the term or any conduct which could be properly termed 
dishonest or immoral. What it meant was merely that the power had been 
exercised for a purpose, or with an intention, beyond the scope of or in a 
manner not justified by the instrument creating the power.38 Therefore, the 
principle was concerned with the abuse of power. What was being done by 
a director was in fact within the scope of the power conferred, but was being 
done for an improper purpose.39 Therefore, what the court suggests is that 
the director's bona fide belief that he/she is acting in the best interests of 
the company would not in itself mean that the director would not ordinarily 
be exercising a power for an improper purpose.40 To ascertain the true state 
of affairs it was equally important to determine the motivational aspects 
which influenced the director in question to act improperly. An inquiry into 
the state of mind of the director at the time would be indispensable. The 
court in Eclairs Group Ltd seems to have recognised this critical aspect, 
                                            
36  Eclairs Group Ltd para 15. 
37  Eclairs Group Ltd para 15, citing previous cases as early as Aleyn v Belchier 1758 1 
Eden 132 138; and Lane v Page 1754 Amb 233. Also see Langford and Ramsay 
2017 MLR 117. In their article the writers were of the view that a subjective test 
provides more autonomy to directors than an objective test. They were of the opinion 
that the judgment of Lord Sumption created uncertainty around the test to be 
adopted. This submission was based on previous commentaries on whether the test 
is subjective or objective. Ultimately, they submitted that in their opinion Lord 
Sumption meant that the test should be both subjective and objective, contrary to 
Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd 1974 AC 821 832 (hereinafter "Howard"), 
wherein Lord Wilberforce said that a court must view a situation objectively where 
there is a dispute as to a decision for one purpose or another. Their reasons for 
agreeing with Lord Sumption will be ventilated below. 
38  Eclairs Group Ltd para 15. 
39  Eclairs Group Ltd para 15. 
40  Madoff para 194. 
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because contrary to the position taken by the court under South African law 
in Visser, the court preferred a subjective test.41 According to the court: 
Where the question is one of abuse of powers, said Viscount Finlay in Hindle 
v John Cotton Ltd (1919) 56 Sc LR 625, 630, the state of mind of those who 
acted, and the motive on which they acted, are all important.42 
Accordingly, it is necessary to subjectively scrutinise the reasons which 
influenced directors to make a particular decision to determine what 
purpose motivated them and/or ascertain what purpose occupied their mind 
at the time of their taking a decision. To assist in determining the purpose 
for which the conferred power was exercised or to ascertain whether a 
director can be said to have exercised a power for the purpose for which it 
was conferred, the court stated in Madoff that a four-stage test must be 
employed. The court's approach may be universally applicable.43 Also, 
looking at the court judgments discussed hereunder, the universality of the 
application of the four-stage test seems to have been the foundation upon 
which the various courts have relied. The test involves the identification of: 
(i) the power whose exercise is in question; (ii) the proper purpose for which 
the power was conferred; (iii) the substantial purpose for which the power 
was exercised in the instant case; and (iv) whether that purpose was 
proper.44 
It is submitted that when applying this four-stage test in the context of 
distributing company money and/or property the first leg would refer to the 
power which the director has. In Howard,45 ruling in the context of self-
interest, the court stated that the determination of the power exercised by 
directors, including the nature of the power and any limits within which it 
may be exercised, represents the legal question. In the South African 
context, quite apart from its counterparts, the powers which a director must 
use for such purpose are conferred by the 2008 Act. Directors no longer 
derive their powers from the company's Memorandum of Incorporation 
(hereinafter "the MOI") as is the case in Australia and Canada. It is 
submitted that the character of the power is inherent in the duties which 
directors possess as conferred by the 2008 Act.46 Shareholders may vary 
                                            
41  Eclairs Group Ltd para 15. 
42  Eclairs Group Ltd para 15. 
43  Madoff para 195; approved in Howard 835F-H; Extrasure Travel Insurances v 
Scattergood 2003 1 BCLC 598 para 92. See also Delport et al Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 298(1). 
44  Also see Visser para 80. 
45  Howard. The court stated that where self-interest is involved, the directors of the 
company cannot assert that their actions were bona fide in the interest of the 
company. However, credit must be given to the bona fide position of the directors 
and their judgment in matters of management must be respected. 
46  Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd 2013 ZAWCHC 89 (14 June 2013) ("PB Meat (Pty) 
Ltd") para 25. 
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this power in the company's MOI, but, even the shareholders cannot vary 
the power in whatever form they think proper. The variation must constitute 
an additional protective measure to the company by limiting, restricting or 
qualifying these powers or the activities of the company.47 Directors must 
act within these powers at all times. To act contrary will not always suggest 
that the power was exercised improperly or for an improper purpose, 
however. 
In terms of the second leg, the proper purpose for which the power was 
conferred will be paramount. In most statutes the proper purpose for which 
a power is conferred is not expressly stated. The 2008 Act is no exception. 
However, one may infer that in the context of distributions, the purpose for 
which the power is conferred on directors is to facilitate the proper 
distribution of company money and/or property. When doing so, directors 
must therefore not act in a manner that will contravene the distribution rules 
so as to compromise the solvency and liquidity of the company. In Msimang 
v Katuliiba48 the court stated that in order to assess whether directors 
acted in a manner contravening the Act their conduct in relation to their 
duties as directors must be scrutinised. Where the power has been 
properly exercised, the courts, taking into account the business judgment 
rule, may not invalidate the exercise of that power without justification. At all 
times they must bear in mind that it remains the directors' call whether or 
not the distribution in question should have been made, having taken into 
account their statutory and fiduciary duties as imposed on them under 
sections 4, 46, 76(3) and (4) of the 2008 Act. As long as the director at the 
time reasonably and rationally believed, having taken into account its 
reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances, that the company would or 
would not sustain the distribution, as the case may be, his decision would 
stand. There must always be a rational basis for his/her belief.  
The second leg invites the application of questions of rationality in regard to 
the decision making process employed by directors. Even under the 2008 
Act the rationality principle finds application by virtue of section 76(4)(a)(iii). 
Much as the use of the requirement of rationality in the context of company 
law has been articulated in various other cases such as Charterbridge 
Corporation Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd49 and The Manning River Cooperative 
                                            
47  See s 15(2)(a)(iii) of the 2008 Act. S 15 of the 2008 Act allows for the company to 
limit, restrict or qualify the powers given to a director. A company is entitled to ratify 
directors' actions, however, by special resolution of shareholders, except for those 
which contravene the Act. See ss 20(2) and (3) of the 2008 Act. 
48  Msimang v Katuliiba 2013 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) ("Msimang") para 51. 
49  Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd 1969 2 All ER 1185 (Ch) 1194E-F. 
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Dairy Co Ltd v Shoesmith,50 the rationality principle has been referred to 
less frequently.51 At its core, the principle of rationality relates to the fact that 
decisions made by those on whom powers have been conferred must be 
related to the purpose for which the powers were given.52 In the context of 
the exercise of public power, the requirement of rationality has been held in 
some court judgments to concern the relationship between the decision and 
purpose for which the power was given.53 The question was asked in this 
way: "was the decision or the means employed rationally related to the 
purpose for which the power was given"?54 This vital relationship between 
"the power conferred" and "the purpose of its use" was made clear in 
Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited,55 
where the Western Cape High Court intimated that: 
Rationality is a minimum threshold requirement applicable to the exercise of 
all public power by members of the executive and other functionaries. It is a 
requirement of the principle of legality that decisions must be rationally related 
to the purpose for which the power was given, otherwise they are in effect 
arbitrary.56 
                                            
50  The Manning River Cooperative Dairy Co Ltd v Shoesmith 1915 19 CLR 714 (HC) 
723; and Mactra Properties Ltd v Morstead Mansion Ltd 2008 EWHC 2843 (Ch) para 
7. 
51  Visser para 75. 
52  Under the 2008 Act the principle of rationality applies to the business judgment rule. 
In exercising their powers, the rule requires directors to ensure that they have no 
personal interests and that they make use of the benefit of other members of the 
company whom they believe to possess the required competence. Richard Stevens 
and Philip de Beer make two observations with regard to the principle of rationality. 
They refer to two salient factors arising from the business judgment rule: that 
directors must take reasonable steps to ensure that their decision is informed; and 
that they must believe that the decision was in the best interests of the company. 
These factors arise from the operation of s 76(4) of the 2008 Act. To that end, the 
two factors identified represent steps which directors must take to ensure that they 
comply with their duties in terms of s 76(3)(c) as informed by s 76(4) of the 2008 Act. 
But the underlying requirement that the directors made their decision on a rational 
basis. See Stevens and de Beer 2016 SA Merc LJ 257. 
53  Visser para 77. 
54  Association of Regional Magistrates of Southern Africa v President of the Republic 
of South Africa 2013 7 BCLR 762 (CC) paras 49-50; Minister of Defence and Military 
Veterans v Motau 2014 5 SA 69 (CC) para 69. 
55  Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited 2015 1 SA 
551 (WCC), per Schippers J. Also see how rationality in the context of the legality 
principle was said to operate in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In 
re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 90. 
56  Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited 2015 1 SA 
551 (WCC) para 71. See also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In 
re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) paras 85 
and 90. See also in Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 1 SA 
566 (CC) para 78, wherein the court amongst others, stated that "the holder of power 
must act in good faith and not misconstrue his/her power; public power should not 
be exercised arbitrarily or irrationally; there must be lawfulness in the conduct of the 
person exercising the public power". 
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The court in Visser stated that the rationality criterion as an aid to section 
76 of the 2008 Act is objective.57 It is submitted that there is no reason why 
this administrative law principle should not, with appropriate modification, 
apply equally to directors, whose power has been conferred on them by 
statute, like the power conferred on public officials.58 Consequently, in order 
for a decision to be rational the provision of cogent reasons for taking that 
decision will be one of the criteria justifying the decision.59 
On the third leg, in Howard the court stated that the examination of the 
substantial/primary purpose for which an action was taken, leading to a 
conclusion as to whether or not that purpose was proper, is a factual 
question. In that context, facts will have to be established through the 
presentation of evidence so as to determine what motivated a director to act 
in a particular manner as well as to ascertain his/her state of mind at the 
time, whether indeed the director in question acted with that particular 
purpose in mind or whether or not his/her decision was informed by the 
interests of the company.60 If the board/director distributes company money 
                                            
57  However, according to Visser para 76, its threshold is quite different from, and 
easily met than a determination as to whether the decision was objectively in the 
best interests of the company. A court must not allow itself to delve into the arena of 
decision making conferred on directors by, for example, giving views on how the 
power should have been exercised. The wisdom to make decisions on behalf of the 
company is conferred on directors. Rather what the court must do is to review 
whether the decision made was rationally related to the purpose for which the power 
was conferred. See also the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re 
Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 90. See 
also Stevens and De Beer 2016 SA Merc LJ 259. 
58  Visser para 78. 
59  Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited 2015 1 SA 
551 (WCC) para 83. See also Eclairs Group Ltd para 17; and R(FDA) v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions 2013 1 WLR 444 paras 67-69. In South Africa however, 
in as far as private companies are concerned, the 2008 Act does not require directors 
to furnish reasons for their decisions as is the case under s 771(b) of the UK 
Companies Act, 2006. There is no general duty on a fiduciary to give reasons for 
his/her actions to those to whom their duties are owed: "the duty of a fiduciary to 
render an account is a duty to disclose what he has done in the course of his 
administration, not why he has done it". As a result, an MOI may allow a Board not 
to give reasons on a decision which it has taken on a particular matter. The 
administration of corporations would become unwieldly if directors were bound on 
request to provide reasons for their decisions. In relation to share transfers, there 
might be sound business reasons not to provide reasons. To do so might jeopardise 
the company's relations with third parties. The directors might be reluctant publicly 
to state reservations they have concerning the character of the proposed transferee. 
The furnishing of reasons might require the company to disclose matters of strategy. 
Visser paras 46-49. 
60  It is submitted that the substantial purpose for which the power was exercised in the 
particular case will invite questions such as: what was the "primary purpose" for 
which the power was exercised; was it to give effect to the interests of the company 
or was it for personal purposes; did the board refuse to register the transfer of shares 
informed by personal interests or by those of the company; did the director act 
fraudulently or with a fraudulent purpose; did the director act intentionally to deny 
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and/or property based on ulterior motives, such conduct would be unlawful. 
It is submitted that it is at this stage that an objective test is called for to 
establish whether the directors acted objectively, even though subjectively 
they might have intended to act for the benefit of the company. Hence a 
sanction must not be applied until it is proven that the exercise of the power 
was not for a proper purpose, as the fourth leg requires. 
4 Juridical determinations of the appropriate standard of 
judgment 
The operation of the above principles and the divergence in the standards 
of judgment applied to them can be gleaned/observed in the following 
cases. The case law discussion which follows relates to three jurisdictions, 
being South Africa, Australia and Canada. UK case law will be discussed in 
conjunction with South African case law. The consideration of UK case law 
is informed by the fact that one of the UK provisions regulating the duties of 
directors is similar to one of the provisions under the 2008 Act which will be 
referred to hereunder. For that reason, UK company law may serve as a 
comparitor for the purpose of interpreting and applying the principle of 
proper purpose in the South African context. 
4.1 South Africa  
The first among these is the South African case of Visser.61 From the 
outset it is worth noting that in this case the court used both the objective 
and subjective tests at different stages of its judgment to determine 
whether or not the refusal to transfer shares was lawful.62 What seems 
apparent, however, is that of these two tests only the objective standard 
of judgment was used to interpret and analyse/apply the duty to act for 
a proper purpose. The case concerned an application for refusal by the 
board of the first respondent, Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter 
("GHS"), to approve a transfer by the applicant, Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd 
(hereinafter "VC"), to the second respondent, Mouton Sitrus (hereinafter 
"MC"), of the shares held by VC in GHS. The shares were not 
necessarily to be transferred from the company to the shareholder in 
question, but from one shareholder to another. VC sought to compel 
                                            
dividend payments unjustifiably or did the director act without care as to the interests 
of the company, for example by not caring whether the company became insolvent 
as a result of his/her actions? For other situations in the context of good faith in the 
interests of the company, see Langford and Ramsay 2015 JBL 174. 
61  Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) 2014 5 SA 179 (WCC). 
62  See for example Visser para 76, referring to the test applicable to rationality under s 
76 as objective. Also see para 80 referring to proper purpose as provided in s 
76(3)(a) as objective. Also see paras 73-74 referring to the test under s 76(4)(a) as 
subjective. 
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GHS to register the transfer by way of relief in terms of section 163 of 
the 2008 Act, stating that any refusal by GHS to register the transfer of 
shares without rational or cogent reasons would constitute oppressive 
and unfair prejudicial conduct.63 VC also sought the amendment of a 
clause in GHS' MOI restricting the transferability of its shares.64  
In invoking the provisions of section 163, the claim by the applicants 
related to the question whether GHS' directors breached their fiduciary 
duties in refusing to register the transfer.65 In response, the court ruled 
that if a director acts and/or exercises the power conferred on it by the 
company's MOI, and in so doing meets the standard set under section 
76 of the 2008 Act, the director would be acting lawfully.66 The question 
posed by the court was: "Can a shareholder who is prejudiced by the 
decision then complain that the decision is 'unfairly' prejudicial to him?" 
In other words, where directors act lawfully and in accordance with the 
standard imposed on them without any malice, their decision cannot be 
reversed by a court simply because the decision adversely affects 
another person's interests. The director's' decision will stand. In fact, 
the counsel for the applicants conceded that circumstances where 
directors would be found to have acted unlawfully could be rare, 
especially where directors exercised their powers in good faith, for a 
proper purpose, in the best interests of the company.67 Applying the 
dominant purpose test, the court emphasised that the test for proper 
purpose is objective, the overarching purpose for which directors must 
exercise their powers being the purpose of promoting the interests of 
the company:68 
The power to refuse to register a transfer of shares must thus be 
exercised in what the directors consider to be the best interests of the 
company. More specifically, the clause conferring the power has in mind 
that there may be circumstances in which a company's best interests 
would be served by not having the proposed transferee as the holder of 
the shares in question. The board might consider that it would be 
preferable, in the best interests of the company, that the proposed 
transferee should not become a shareholder at all or that he should not 
acquire a greater stake than he already has. The exercise of the power 
                                            
63  Visser para 29. 
64  Visser paras 1 and 10-13. 
65  Visser para 52. 
66  Visser para 59. 
67  Visser para 59. This, however, does not mean that such cases may not exist , 
as in Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd (No 2)  2013 FCA 672. 
68  Visser paras 45, 80. Also see Village Cay Marina Ltd v Acland 1998 UKPC 11 
(BVI); Mactra Properties Ltd v Morshead Mansions Ltd 2008 EWHC 2843 (Ch) 
para 7; Banfi Ltd v Moran 2006 IEHC 257; Smolaret v Liwszyc 2006 WASCA 
50 paras 67-68. 
SS BIDIE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  17 
will often, by its very nature, result in prejudice to the parties to the 
proposed transfer.69 
Summing up what was in its mind in this regard, the court ruled that, in its 
opinion having had the benefit of hearing a description of the process 
followed by the directors and the various board meetings in which the 
decisions were taken,70 at the time of decision making the directors of GHS 
were bona fide of the opinion that the best interests of the company would 
be served by not allowing MC to increase its shareholding in GHS. In the 
court's view, the actual purpose for which GHS' board exercised the power 
to refuse the proposed transfer fell within one of the intended purposes of 
the empowering provision, that is, to enable the board to prevent a person 
from acquiring an increased shareholding in the company where the 
obtaining of the increased shareholding was regarded as being contrary to 
the best interests of the company.71  
Further, VC alleged that the board had exercised the power for an improper 
purpose because the directors were using the power as leverage to force 
MC to conclude a long-term contract, even though the MOI permitted short-
term contracts. Again the court ruled in favour of the board. Referring to the 
adequacy of the information which the directors made reference to before 
making the decision in question so as to enable themselves to make a 
proper decision, the court noted that even if the argument raised was the 
board's purpose, the court was not convinced that it was an improper 
purpose. This was so because the board of a company is entitled to 
encourage long-term contracts if this would best serve the interests of the 
company.72 Besides, MC did not allege that the directors had failed to take 
reasonable diligent steps to inform themselves of the facts relevant to their 
decision, and even if they had made that argument, the court ruled that it 
had no reason to doubt that, as business people, the directors had sufficient 
information at their disposal to make a proper assessment.73 
As to whether the decision of the directors had a rational basis, the court 
stated that simply because the applicants had a different view from that of 
the board, that in itself did not mean that the applicants had a better way 
forward for GHS than the course which the board of GHS was charting. 
Therefore, this would not mean that the board was acting irrationally by 
preferring its view to that of MC.74 It would be fallacious to take the view that 
a proposed transferee always acquires shares with a view to better 
                                            
69  Visser para 81. 
70  Visser paras 14-30. 
71  Visser para 84. 
72  Visser para 85. 
73  Visser para 86. 
74  Visser para 88. 
SS BIDIE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  18 
advancing what he regards as the best interests of the company. The 
transferee may have other business interests which would be enhanced if 
the affairs of the target company were curtailed or conducted differently.75 
Therefore, the court concluded that in refusing to approve the transfer the 
board had met the standard set by section 76 of the 2008 Act and that the 
refusal was lawful.76 The court dismissed the application.77 
In Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd78 the ultimate decision of the court suggests 
that the court preferred the dominant purpose test as well as the objective 
test, as in the Visser case, to determine whether or not the directors of the 
company were acting for their own interests or in the interests of the 
company. The court did not refer to the subjective test. Essentially, the 
allegations levelled against the applicants were that they had not acted bona 
fide and in the best interests of the company in making an application 
requesting further company records. Their argument was that in making the 
application for access to the records, they were doing so in order to be able 
to perform their duties as directors of the company. In its ruling the court 
stated that the applicant's access to company records must be fettered by 
the purpose for which such access was sought. The court held that the 
request for documentation by the applicants was not for the purpose of 
exercising their powers and performing their duties in the best interests of 
the company. In fact, the purpose was so that they could defend the 
allegations levelled against them, which went to the root of the performance 
of their duties in terms of section 76 of the 2008 Act. Having assessed the 
reasons informing their application, the court found that the applicants did 
not request the information to protect the company, but to protect 
themselves as individual directors. Therefore, the court denied the 
applicants access to the information they required. 
If the approach in the above two cases is compared to one of the most 
important cases on proper purpose in UK case law, a different picture 
appears. The UK case in question was decided by the Supreme Court, 
                                            
75  Visser para 89. 
76  Visser para 95. 
77  Visser para 98. PB Meat (Pty) Ltd paras 27, 44 and 49. The duty to act for a proper 
purpose has also been deliberated upon in pension fund cases. See for example the 
case of Hoffman v Pension Funds Adjudicator 2012 2 All SA 198 (WCC). In the case 
the court found the administrators of the fund to have acted for an improper purpose 
based on para (a) of s 1 of the definition of "complaint" in the Pension Funds Act 24 
of 1956. They were also found not to have acted in accordance with their duties as 
required in paragraph (d) of the definition of "complaint" in the same Act. This was 
so because the Fund failed to investigate or apply its own mind to the instruction 
given by the applicant's employer for the employee to be classified as a Class 2 
Executive instead of being a Class 1 Executive, thus affecting his retirement pension 
adversely. See paras 29, 32, 45 and 46. Also see Berge v Alexander Forbes 
Retirement Fund (Pension Section) 2006 ZAGPHC 241 (18 April 2006). 
78  PB Meat (Pty) Ltd. 
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based on the Companies Act 2006. The case is that of Eclairs Group Ltd.79 
In the case the Supreme Court of Appeal seemed to apply both the 
subjective and the objective tests, informed by the dominant purpose for 
which the power was used, which influenced the directors to make the 
decision they did, rather than only the objective test preferred in Visser and 
the Australian case of Howard discussed hereunder. This "subjective and 
objective dominant purpose test" is qualified by the "causation test" due to 
the possible existence of multiple causes, some proper and some improper. 
The latter test places emphasis on the existence of a link between the 
improper use of the conferred power and the end result, as in where, for 
example, "but for" the improper purpose the power would not have been 
exercised or the result in question would not have materialised. 
Importantly, in the Eclairs Group Ltd decision Lord Sumption set out a 
number of principles applicable in cases related to proper purpose. 
According to Lord Sumption, in determining purpose it was not necessary 
that the purpose of an instrument should be expressly stated. Rather, 
                                            
79  Eclairs Group Ltd. See a summary of the facts of the case in ICLR 2015 
http://www.iclr.co.uk/case-summaries/2015/wlrd/497; and Langford and Ramsay 
2017 MLR 117. The case was about two directors who were alleged to be attempting 
to obtain voting control by entering into an arrangement to combine their 
shareholding. The purpose of the control was to orchestrate a "raid" on the company 
by using their voting power to purchase the company's shares for a value below their 
market value. In response, the company issued disclosures in terms of s 793 of the 
Companies Act, 2006. The section provides that a public company may issue a 
disclosure notice on any person that it knows, or reasonably believes, to be 
interested in its shares, requesting information including the number of shares held, 
the beneficial ownership of such shares, and any agreements or arrangements 
between the persons interested in them. In terms of s 794, if a person to whom such 
notice was issued fails to comply, the company may apply for a court order imposing 
restrictions on the shares, including their transfer, the exercise of voting rights, and 
the right to receive the payment of capital or income. This provision was incorporated 
into the company's articles of association, thus authorising the directors to invoke 
the clause without a court order. The directors in question submitted the information 
required, but the directors remained unconvinced that there were no arrangements. 
Consequently, the directors issued restrictions in terms of the section preventing the 
two directors from voting at the upcoming company's AGM, including voting in the 
re-appointment of the company's Chief Executive Officer. The two directors opposed 
the restrictions, alleging that they were invoked for an improper purpose contrary to 
s 171(b) of the Companies Act, 2006. At the High Court the ruling was in favour of 
the applicants. The court was of the view that the directors' decision on the effected 
restrictions in question were not motivated by the lack of accuracy of the information 
supplied by the applicants. Rather, the directors' decision was unduly influenced by 
the ulterior motive of preventing the raiders from blocking the resolutions at the 
ensuing AGM. The court agreed, however, that notwithstanding the fact that the 
restrictions were genuinely issued in the best interests of the company and its other 
shareholders, such restrictions were outside the scope of the proper purpose and 
scope of article 42 of the company's constitution. In the Appeal Court, the High Court 
decision was overturned, the court stating that proper purpose had no significance 
to the application of article 42. 
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purpose would usually be implied from a mixture of the express terms of the 
instrument, an analysis of their effect and form, and the court's 
understanding of the business context. Primarily, proper purpose is 
concerned with the abuse of power by engaging in acts which are within the 
scope of the power but exercised for an improper reason or motive. An 
assessment of whether the power has been properly exercised is therefore 
necessarily subjective and dependent on the state of mind of the persons 
exercising the power. To determine whether a power has been properly 
exercised, it is necessary to assess the primary or dominant purpose 
motivating the use of the power.80 However, the assessment must be made 
having considered the range of a director's functions and the conflicts may 
be inseparable from the position of a director.81 A court of equity needed not 
just to uphold the integrity of the decision-making process. Its purpose was 
to limit its intervention in the conduct of a company's affairs to cases in which 
an injustice has resulted from the directors' having taken irrelevant 
considerations into account.82 Put differently, it is the overall determination 
which directors must make which borders on what motivated them to opt for 
that particular decision. Leaning on the objective standard of judgment, 
according to the court one possibility in identifying the dominant purpose is 
to choose between the "weightiest" purpose about which the directors would 
feel most strongly and the purpose which caused the decision to be made 
as it was.83 As there are likely to be multiple causes, some proper some 
improper, the relevant test should be that of causation, that is, "but for" the 
relevant motive, the power would not have been exercised.84 To the court 
this approach was correct since it was consistent with the rationale behind 
the proper purpose rule.85  
In cases where the director would have made the same decision anyway 
had he/she acted for a proper purpose, the court stated that the act would 
remain valid despite the existence of some improper considerations.86 
Proper purpose is precisely meant to apply and most valuable to apply in 
situations where there are conflicting factors and where the affairs of a 
company are contested. In such circumstances, this is a primary tool for 
ensuring that directors act within their powers and recognise the difference 
between their powers and those of a company's shareholders. Ultimately, it 
                                            
80  Eclairs Group Ltd para 17. 
81  Eclairs Group Ltd para 17. 
82  Eclairs Group Ltd para 17. 
83  Eclairs Group Ltd para 19. 
84  Eclairs Group Ltd para 19. See the Australian case of Whitehouse v Carlton House 
Pty 1987 162 CLR 285 295.  
85  Eclairs Group Ltd para 22; citing decisions based on the equity principle Birley v 
Birley 1858 25 Beav 299 307; Pryor v Pryor 1864 2 De G J & S 205, 210; Roadchef 
(Employee Benefits Trustees) Ltd v Hill 2014 EWHC 109 (Ch) para 130. 
86  Eclairs Group Ltd para 21. 
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is up to the board to decide whether the information provided is sufficient. 
However, there will always be room for the directors to decide erroneously. 
In the end, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal and dismissed 
the directors' decision. In the eyes of the court the manner in which the 
directors in the Eclairs Group Ltd case acted proved that they did so for an 
improper purpose. This was so because they were primarily influenced by 
seeking to influence the outcome of the proposed shareholder resolutions, 
rather than to obtain the information sought by the prior disclosure notices. 
The court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the directors were 
found to have acted rationally and in a genuine belief that they were acting 
in the best interests of the company. 
RT Langford and IM Ramsay discuss the case in the context of the 
implications for the autonomy of directors of the different judicial 
interpretations of the proper purpose rule.87 Expressing their views on 
whether courts should adopt an objective or a subjective test when 
interpreting the proper purpose rule, as well as on the fact that Lord 
Sumption seemingly used a subjective test to dispense with Eclairs Group 
Ltd, the authors first acknowledge that Lord Sumption used a subjective test 
to analyse the proper purpose rule. Further, they acknowledge that the use 
of the subjective test was contrary to the views of corporate law scholars 
and of earlier authority.88 Nevertheless, in their opinion the use of the test 
by the Lord was correct. Their support is based on their interpretation of 
what Lord Sumption said. The UK Supreme Court of Appeal in Eclairs 
Group Ltd referred to the duty of proper purpose under the Act as one 
determined on subjective standards and the motives which informed the 
directors' decision at the time. According to Langford and Ramsay what Lord 
Sumption meant by the latter statement was that the proper purpose rule 
encapsulates both subjective and objective elements, and his statement 
that the test is subjective should therefore be interpreted as meaning that.89 
Their support for the use of the test is based on two grounds. The first is 
that, following the statement that the test is subjective, Lord Sumption cited 
Hindle v John Cotton Ltd (see under Heading 3 page 11 above). The 
statement made was that "the state of mind of those who acted, and the 
                                            
87  They discuss three issues relating to the interpretation of the rule that have important 
consequences for whether directors have broad or narrow autonomy in their 
decision-making. They discuss: the scope of the proper purpose rule; whether an 
objective or subjective test is employed in the application of the rule; and the test for 
causation, where a director is motivated by mixed purposes. See Langford and 
Ramsay 2017 MLR 111. 
88  Langford and Ramsay 2017 MLR 117. They make reference to such writers as 
Davies and Worthington Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law 16-
46, and to the decision in Howard. 
89  Langford and Ramsay 2017 MLR 117. 
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motive on which they acted, are all important". According to Langford and 
Ramsay this statement means that:  
… in order to determine for what purpose directors made the decision under 
review, it is necessary to understand their subjective motivations. 
To that end, they submit that the application of the objective test, in addition 
to the subjective test, has the purpose of ascertaining as a matter of law the 
purposes for which the power may or may not be exercised. It is also to 
determine/test whether the purpose which the directors in question say 
motivated them to make the decision in question was permissible.90  
Their second concern is their difficulty in reconciling the decision of Lord 
Sumption (that the directors had acted for an improper purpose) with the 
application of a subjective test.91 The majority of the directors were in fact 
found to have based their action on a genuine belief that it was proper for 
them to issue the restriction notices. But the same genuine subjective belief 
which was required and which the directors were found to have possessed 
at the time of making their decision was not enough to protect their' decision. 
According to the authors this suggests that from the point of view of the 
court, the directors failed to act for a proper purpose as objectively 
determined by the court.92 
It is proposed that what the above submissions suggest is that the fact that 
a director has acted subjectively will not for all purposes mean that he has 
ultimately also acted objectively. His/her motives might have influenced 
him/her not to act objectively even though subjectively he was genuine in 
carrying out his duties to his principal. If the court finds that a director has 
passed a subjective test, that in itself shall not be regarded as being enough 
to satisfy the duty to act for a proper purpose. What must also be satisfied 
is the requirement that one acted objectively as well. According to Langford 
and Ramsay the ruling of Lord Sumption means that a test which considers 
the subjective motivations of directors is ultimately an objective test. In their 
words: 
This test assesses the conduct of directors against what the court determines 
are the proper purposes for which a particular power can be exercised and 
thereby places a restraint on directors' conduct and limits their available 
actions. It is a test that has particular importance in the context of a battle for 
corporate control.93 
                                            
90  Langford and Ramsay 2017 MLR 118. 
91  Langford and Ramsay 2017 MLR 118. 
92  Langford and Ramsay 2017 MLR 118. 
93  Langford and Ramsay 2017 MLR 118. 
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Having read the case, and as has been noted in the discussion above, the 
question which comes to the fore is: whether it is possible for a director to 
act genuinely subjectively and yet act improperly from an objective point of 
view? It is submitted that in applying both the subjective and objective 
standards of judgment, the Eclairs Group Ltd case confirmed that this is 
possible. The opinion of Langford and Ramsay is therefore supported. What 
they suggest is that subjectively speaking a person may have proper 
motives and as such carry him/herself properly in that regard, but the power 
itself may be exercised for an improper purpose, hence objectively speaking 
a court would not sanction any action which to the court bears no relation to 
proper purpose, even though subjectively speaking the actions of the 
director in question were proper. 
4.2 Canada 
From the outset it must be stated that there is no duty to act for a proper 
purpose under the CBCA in terms of section 122(1)(a) regulating the duty 
of good faith. Nevertheless, Canadian courts seem to appreciate the 
application of the subjective standard of judgment when determining the 
motivational aspects of a director. This standard is applied in conjunction 
with the objective standard. One deduces from the decisions of the courts 
that had section 122(1)(a) of the CBCA also contained the duty to act for a 
proper purpose alongside the duty of good faith, as is the case under the 
2008 Act and the Corporations Act 2001, the subjective standard of 
judgment would be the preferred standard where motivational aspects of a 
director's conduct are under scrutiny. It is in this context that the two cases 
below are discussed. 
To that end, the application of both the subjective and objective standards 
of judgment were visible in the almost half a century old case of Teck Corp 
Ltd v Millar94 on corporate law, relating to directors' fiduciary duties in the 
context of a take-over bid. The premise from which the court set out and the 
principles evoked in the case seem to resonate with those in Visser. The 
court seemed to be referring to the application of the subjective standard or 
to the motivational aspects which tend to inform the decision of directors 
when it stated that before directors take a decision, they must first have 
informed themselves. For example, if someone seeks to take control of a 
company, directors of the company must be allowed to ask who is seeking 
                                            
94  The court discussed the validity of the steps which might be taken by directors to 
resist a take-over bid. The relevant question related to how wide a latitude directors 
ought to have. Should directors ignore those who seek to take control of a company, 
or are they entitled to consider the consequences of the take over? Teck Corp Ltd v 
Millar 1973 33 DLR (3d) 288 BCSC; Savoy Corp Ltd v Development Underwriting 
Ltd 1963 NSWR 138 147; Criterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties 2002 
EWHC 496 (Ch). 
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control and why. If, after they have informed themselves, they believe that 
there will be substantial damage to the company's interests if the company 
is taken over, the exercise of their power to defeat the taking of control will 
not necessarily be categorised as improper. Suggesting the application of 
an objective test, however, the court later stated that directors must act in 
good faith and must have reasonable grounds for their belief. According to 
the court impropriety may lie in the directors' purposes. A finding of 
impropriety would be based on proof that the directors' decision was 
actuated by collateral purpose. It does not depend on the nature of any 
shareholders' rights that may be affected by the exercise of the power 
concerned. In Teck Corp Ltd Berger J eventually ruled that the purpose of 
the directors was not to keep themselves in control. In fact, the purpose was 
to prevent the deal from materialising. To the court, this was a proper 
purpose which the directors were entitled to use their powers to prevent.  
The Peoples case is not strictly speaking a proper purpose case. However, 
it is introduced here to illustrate the application of both the subjective and 
objective test. In its decision the court was emphatic as to which standard 
of judgement is preferred in Canada when the duties of directors are in 
question. On route to applying the subjective test, the court first referred to 
the fiduciary duty in section 122(1)(a). The court stated that section 
122(1)(a) requires that directors and officers of a company in their dealings 
involving the use of the company's resources are to make reasonable 
business decisions that are to the advantage of the company.95 In other 
words, only the company is expected to benefit from the performance of 
director's duties. Directors must respect the trust and confidence placed in 
them to manage the assets and affairs of the business in pursuit of the 
realisation of the objects of the company.96 Referring to whether a subjective 
or an objective test applied in the circumstances of the case, the court in 
Peoples stated that under section 122(1)(b) of the CBCA the test was 
objective. From the point of view of the court it was clear that the factual 
aspects of the circumstances surrounding the actions of directors or officers 
are important only when the court considers the directors' duty of care.97 
Where the court also has to consider the motivational aspects of a director's 
decision then a subjective standard will be the central focus of the statutory 
fiduciary duty under the duty of good faith in section 122(1)(a), exercised in 
the best interests of the company.98 The understanding here is that under 
                                            
95  Peoples para 34. 
96  They must avoid abusing their position to gain personal benefit. They must also 
maintain the confidentiality of any information they acquire by virtue of their position. 
They must serve the company selflessly, honestly and loyally. Peoples para 35, 
citing McGuinness Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations 715; KLB 
v British Columbia 2003 SCC 51 (CanLII). 
97  Peoples para 63. 
98  Peoples para 63. 
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section 122(1)(a) and (b) of the CBCA an objective test applies under the 
latter subsection. A subjective test will apply only were a court has to engage 
in the motivational aspects of a decision if the duty being determined is the 
duty of good faith as regulated in terms of the former subsection. As was 
alluded to earlier, in Canada there is no duty to act for a proper purpose 
under the CBCA. However, had it been included it is assumed that it 
probably would have been regulated alongside the duty of good faith in 
section 122(1)(a), as is the case under the different statutes which are the 
subject of discussion in this paper. If that were to be the case, then it seems 
that a subjective standard of judgement would apply. 
4.3 Australia 
In perusing some of the early Australian cases on proper purpose, the 
principles applied seem to be similar to those applied in the above cases, 
especially with reference to the dominant purpose test. Where they differ 
from the above cases is in the application of either the subjective or the 
objective test. The Australian cases emphasise the objective test rather than 
the subjective test. In Howard99 the court agreed with the above cases, 
when it ruled that in order to judge whether a proposed action is not in 
pursuit of self-interest, the actions of the board of directors must be used as 
a guideline to determine their purpose for allotting additional shares owing 
to the lack of a clear list of different corporate actions that could constitute 
an improper purpose. Although the court did not classify the actions of the 
board as the consideration of motivational aspects, looked at in hindsight 
the court seems to have been referring to such motivational aspects. 
Nevertheless, according to the court, self-interest would constitute a ground 
for finding an improper purpose when the true purpose for an allotment of 
shares is to dilute the majority voting power. However, the court used an 
objective test rather than a subjective test to determine liability. According 
to the court, when a dispute arises over whether a company made a 
decision for one purpose or for another, or where there is more than one 
purpose and one of them has to be the substantial or primary purpose, the 
court will be entitled to look at the situation objectively in order to estimate 
how critical or pressing, or substantial or per contra insubstantial an alleged 
requirement may have been.100 If the court finds that a particular 
requirement, though real, was not urgent or critical, at the relevant time, it 
may have reason to doubt or discount the assertions of individuals that they 
                                            
99  Howard 835. 
100  Howard 832F-H; Eclairs Group Ltd para 24. This case is also discussed in Kilian 
2007 
http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2007/2007CK_ODPPNPSA
CA.pdf 17. 
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acted solely in order to deal with it, especially where their actions were 
unusual or even extreme.101 
Another of the earliest of these cases is Harlowe's Nominees Pty Ltd v 
Woodside (Lake Entrance) Oil Company NL.102 In this case the High Court 
ruled that the first task of a trial judge was to decide whether it had been 
established to his satisfaction, even if on a balance of probabilities, that the 
directors of the company were actuated by an improper purpose.103 In 
establishing this fact the court takes cognizance of the process followed by 
the directors, their thinking and their actions leading to their decision 
making.104 As was submitted in the case of Howard above, by looking at the 
line of thinking of the directors the court seems to have recognised that 
establishing the motives of the directors is indispensable. The court also 
stated that in cases where directors must issue shares, there may be 
occasions when directors may fairly and properly issue shares for various 
reasons. What is required is that those reasons must relate to the purpose 
of benefitting the company as a whole. The purpose must not be to maintain 
control of the company by the directors themselves or their friends.105 
According to the court: "an enquiry as to whether additional capital was 
presently required is often most relevant to the ultimate question upon which 
the validity or invalidity of the issue depends; but the ultimate question must 
always be whether in truth the issue was decided honestly in the interests 
of the company".106 The court continued: 
Directors in whom are vested the right and the duty of deciding where the 
company's interests lie and how they are to be served may be concerned with 
a wide range of practical considerations, and their judgment, if exercised in 
good faith and not for irrelevant purposes, is not open to review in the 
courts.107 
                                            
101  Howard 832F-H; and Eclairs Group Ltd para 24. 
102  Harlowe' Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lake Entrance) Oil Company NL 1968 HCA 
37 (hereinafter "Harlowe'). In the case Woodside was engaged in gas and oil 
exploration. In its explorations it collaborated with other companies. The company 
had issued share capital. The directors of the company were concerned about a 
"mystery buyer" acquiring substantial shareholding in the company and allotted 
shares to B. The mystery buyer challenged the allotment arguing that the allotment 
was for an improper purpose and was not made in the best interests of the company. 
According to the buyer the power could not have been exercised bona fide in the 
best interests of the company. 
103  Harlowe' para 7. 
104  Harlowe' paras 10-14. See paras 15-18 for comments on each of the director's 
thinking and the trial court's view on their evidence as whether or not they were 
reliable witnesses. 
105  Harlowe' para 6; Kirwan v Cresvale Far East Ltd (in liq) 2002 NSWCA 395 para 123. 
106  Harlowe' para 6. Also see Richard Brady Franks Ltd v Price 1937 58 CLR 112 142; 
Mills v Mills 1938 60 CLR 150 163, 169; Ngurli Ltd v McCann 1953 90 CLR 425 438-
441. 
107  Harlowe' para 6; Kirwan v Cresvale Far East Ltd (in liq) 2002 NSWCA 395 para 123. 
SS BIDIE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  27 
Only directors possess the ability to determine the company's best interests 
and how they may serve these interests.108 The allotment of shares would 
be voidable as an abuse of their fiduciary power where the directors create 
an advantage for themselves otherwise than as members of the general 
body of shareholders. Where the allotment is for the purposes of giving the 
company greater freedom to plan for future joint operations to ensure its 
long-term stability rather than to prevent another person from gaining 
control, the decision to allot will suffice.109  
                                            
108  Harlowe' para 125. 
109  Harlowe' para 18. The Harlowe' case was preceded by the case of Ngurli Ltd v 
McCann 1953 90 CLR 425. The question in the case was whether the allotment of 
4199 shares was valid. According to the plaintiff the allotment was not made in good 
faith, nor in the best interests of the company, but was made with the sole fraudulent 
purpose of benefitting one director to the detriment of the plaintiffs. Ngurli Ltd v 
McCann 1953 90 CLR 425-430. The court expressed sentiments similar to those in 
the decision in Harlowe'. The court distinguished between two instances which might 
lead to an intervention by a court: where it is necessary to prevent an abuse by 
majority shareholders in a general meeting; and where it is necessary to prevent an 
abuse by the directors of the powers conferred on them by their articles. In 
comparing these two, a court may more readily interfere when the latter occurs rather 
than the former. Ngurli Ltd v McCann 1953 90 CLR 425 438-439. However, the court 
stated that even with shareholders in a general meeting, there is a limit to the extent 
to which the majority may exercise their votes for their own benefit. For example, the 
power of shareholders to alter the articles of association must, like all other powers, 
be exercised subject to the general principles of law and equity which are applicable 
to all powers conferred on majorities and enable them to bind minorities. The power 
must be exercised, not only in the manner required by law, but also bona fide for the 
benefit of the company as a whole, and it must not be exceeded. Ngurli Ltd v McCann 
1953 90 CLR 425 439. Where the exercise of a power by directors is questioned, a 
higher standard is required from directors as against shareholders. The exercise by 
shareholders of their powers when voting in general meetings is not fiduciary in 
nature. When directors exercise their power, that power is fiduciary in nature and as 
such must be exercised bona fide for the purpose for which it was conferred. It must 
not be used under the cloak of such a purpose for the real purpose of benefitting 
some shareholder or their friends at the expense of other shareholders or so that 
some shareholders or their friends can wrest control of the company from other 
shareholders. Ngurli Ltd v McCann 1953 90 CLR 425 439-440. Also see Delport et 
al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 142 and the cases cited therein. Where it is 
alleged that, in promoting the interests of the company, the directors in question have 
promoted their interests as well, the court intimated that: "if the true effect of the 
whole evidence is, that the defendants truly and reasonably believed at the time that 
what they did was for the interest of the company, they are not chargeable with dolus 
malus or breach of trust merely because in promoting the interests of the company 
they were also promoting their own". Ngurli Ltd v McCann 1953 90 CLR 425 440; 
and Mills v Mills 1938 60 CLR 150. Fraud occurs when the power has been exercised 
for a purpose beyond the scope of or not justified by the instrument creating the 
power. Ngurli Ltd v McCann 1953 90 CLR 425-438. The principles set out in Ngurli 
v McCann were later confirmed in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd 1967 Ch 254. The court 
stated that directors must not use their power to issue shares merely for the purpose 
of maintaining control of the company or merely for the purpose of defeating the 
wishes of the existing majority of shareholders. It is only when the directors act 
oppressively against the minority that a court will interfere with the constitutional 
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Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd,110 was a case decided in 
the context of oppressive and unfair prejudicial conduct. The challenge was 
based on an honest decision by the board. The articles of the respondent 
company permitted its board to determine how many teams should be 
permitted to compete in a rugby competition that year. For that season the 
company's board determined that only 12 teams would compete. A 
company called Wests, which was a member of the respondent and owned 
a team excluded from the 12 selected, complained that the decision of the 
board had an oppressive effect to the interests of the company. The 
decision of the Australian High Court, per Mason ACJ, confirmed the 
principle that the power vested in directors to make decisions inherently 
involved prejudice to another. It stated that to determine the number of 
teams to compete inherently involved prejudice to the team excluded. The 
existence of such prejudice was insufficient to invoke the remedy.111 In 
dismissing the claim, the court acknowledged the fact that it was 
inescapable for any court not to delve into what motives informed director-
made decisions. To that end the court appreciated the special expertise and 
experience that boards possess and the fine line between the bona fide and 
proper exercise of the given power in pursuit of the purpose for which it was 
conferred and the caution which courts must exercise in determining its 
application in order to avoid an unwarranted assumption of responsibility for 
the management of the company.112 
                                            
rights of directors or inquire into the merits of the view held or policies favoured. How 
the court ruled in the recent case of Kirwan v Cresvale Far East Ltd (in liq) 2002 
NSWCA 395 seems to be an exception to the general rule as established in Ngurli v 
McCann and Harlowe' in relation to directors promoting their interests together with 
those of the company. In Kirwan the court stated that: "where a company is in need 
of capital and there is only one avenue of obtaining that capital, then even though 
the person who is subscribing the extra capital and has a dominant purpose in 
obtaining control and even though that person is a director of the company, there 
would be no improper purpose in making the allotment." Kirwan v Cresvale Far East 
Ltd (in liq) 2002 NSWCA 395 para 2. 
110  Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd 1985 HCA 68 para 16 (hereinafter 
"Wayde"). 
111  According to the court the appellants faced a difficult task in seeking to prove that 
the decisions in question were unfairly prejudicial to Wests and therefore not in the 
overall interests of the members as a whole. It had not been shown that those 
decisions of the Board were such that no Board acting reasonably could have made 
them. The effect of those decisions on Wests was harsh indeed. It had not, however, 
been shown that they were oppressive or unfairly prejudicial or discriminatory or that 
their effect was such as to warrant the conclusion that the affairs of the League were 
being conducted in a manner that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial. 
112  Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd 1985 HCA 68 para 16. Brenna J, 
agreeing with the majority, stated the following: "The question here is whether the 
resolutions which were manifestly prejudicial to and discriminatory against Wests, 
were also unfair – that is, so unfair that reasonable directors who considered the 
disability the decision placed on Wests would not have thought it fair to impose it. 
The decision by the League's directors to reduce the number of competitors to 12 
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5 Making a case for both a subjective and an objective 
standard of judgment 
What can be deduced from the above discussion is that the fundamental 
principles upon which the duty of proper purpose rests are the same in all 
the jurisdictions. The difference lies in the preferred standard of judgment 
for purposes of interpretation and practical application. Under the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 it seems settled that courts prefer the objective 
standard of judgment based on the dominant purpose test. Under Teck Corp 
Ltd and the Peoples case the Supreme Court of Canada preferred using 
both an objective and a subjective standard of judgment to judge whether a 
director acted in good faith at the time of decision making. 
In South Africa the position is less clear as to which standard of judgment 
the courts seem to believe the provisions under the 2008 Act related to 
proper purpose contemplate. Divergent views appear in the cases 
considered. Accordingly, it remains arguable whether a subjective or 
objective standard of judgment is the appropriate test to determine whether 
                                            
and exclude Wests was in fact taken with full knowledge of the disability that that 
decision would place on Wests. But the directors also knew that the larger 
competition was burdensome to, and perhaps dangerous for, players and that a 
shorter season was conducive to better organisation of the Premiership Competition. 
The directors had to make a difficult decision in which it was necessary to draw upon 
the skills, knowledge and understanding of experienced administrators of the game 
of rugby league. The Court, in determining whether the decision was unfair, is bound 
to have regard to the fact that the decision was admittedly made by experienced 
administrators to further the interests of the game. There is nothing to suggest 
unfairness save the inevitable prejudice to and discrimination against Wests, but that 
is insufficient by itself to show that reasonable directors with the special qualities 
possessed by experienced administrators would have decided that it was unfair to 
exercise their power in the way the League's directors did." Wayde v New South 
Wales Rugby League Ltd 1985 HCA 68 para 7; with approval in Catalano v 
Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd (No 2) 2013 FCA 672. One of the most 
recent cases decided involved a group of companies. See Equiticorp Finance Ltd (In 
liq) v Bank of New Zealand 1993 32 NSWLR 50 147-148. In assessing the validity 
of the directors applying company funds for the benefit of other companies in the 
group, the trial Judge used an objective test. The court took the position that liability 
would depend on whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director 
of those companies could believe that the application of the liquidity reserves 
towards the repayment of the debt was for the benefit of the companies. The issue 
would be whether the directors exercised their power for the benefit of the company. 
Where they had failed to consider the interests of the relevant company, a finding of 
a breach of duty would suffice. If the transaction was objectively viewed, in the 
interests of the company, no consequences would flow from the breach. The steps 
taken must be to protect the interests of the group of companies as a whole. The 
question would be whether the actions taken for the benefit of the group as a whole 
could be regarded as benefitting one or more companies in the group. An exception 
would be where the interests of an individual company was inextricably bound with 
the welfare of the group. In that case the interests of the group would be the interests 
of the individual company as well. 
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a director acted for a proper purpose in the circumstances of a particular 
case. This is especially so, having regard to the seemingly conflicting 
directions taken by the courts. It is submitted that the better option between 
the two approaches would be to use both the objective and the subjective 
standards of judgment. This is so because, in interpreting proper purpose, 
it would seem that under the 2008 Act courts are required to bear in mind 
the statutory context within which that duty must be construed. They should 
take into account the ordinary meaning as well as the context in which the 
terms of the statute are used and what they were meant to achieve.113 In 
Visser the court seemed to have realised this.114 Such context and meaning 
will be deduced from the text itself as well as from the objects of the Act as 
a whole.115 Most closely allied to the objects of the 2008 Act is the emphasis 
on high standards of corporate governance and the management of 
companies in an efficient and responsible manner. 
As has been argued earlier, the provisions of section 76(3) are meant to 
apply cumulatively and are not meant to be stand-alone provisions, each 
provision fulfilling its own purpose as against the purpose sought to be 
achieved by the other. In that context it is submitted that the duty to act for 
a proper purpose in the distribution of company money or property is related 
to the duty of exercising care, skill and diligence, which is how directors are 
expected to carry out their duties in terms of the objectives provided in 
section 7 of the 2008 Act. In that respect the provisions of section 76(3)(c)(i) 
and (ii) of the 2008 Act cannot be ignored in interpreting and applying the 
duty to act for a proper purpose. The section states that, subject to 
subsection (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that capacity, 
must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director: 
… with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected 
of a person: (i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as 
                                            
113  In City of Cape Town Municipality v SA Local Authorities Pension Fund 2014 2 SA 
365 (SCA) para 25 (hereinafter "City of Cape Town Municipality"), the court stated 
that in looking at the background of the section in question it was important to look 
at the purpose for which the chapter in question was introduced into the Act; LA 
Health Medical Scheme v Horn 2014 3 All SA 421 (SCA); Natal Joint Municipal 
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) paras 18, 26. 
114  Visser para 80. 
115  Asmal v Essa 2016 1 SA 95 (SCA) para 9. Among the relevant objects of the 2008 
Act as provided in s 7 are: to promote compliance with the Bill of Rights; to encourage 
enterprise efficiency and high standards of corporate governance, given the 
significant role of enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation; to 
ensure the use of companies in a manner that enhances the economic welfare of 
South Africa; to balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors 
within companies; to encourage the efficient and responsible management of 
companies; and to provide a predictable and efficient and effective environment for 
the regulation of companies. See ss 7(a), (b), (e), (i), (l) and (j) of the 2008 Act 
respectively. 
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those carried out by that director; and (ii) having the general knowledge, skill 
and experience of that director. 
The s 76(3)(c) provisions closely resemble those contained in s 174 of the 
UK Companies Act 2006.116 Effectively, what the section states is that a 
director will be regarded in law as having exercised his powers for a proper 
purpose if the director acted with care, skill and diligence that may 
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions in 
relation to the company as those carried out by that director who has the 
general knowledge, skill and experience of that director in the 
circumstances of the case. It is clear from the wording of this section117 that 
the standard to assess whether the directors carried out their duties for a 
proper purpose cannot only be objective. The section seems to suggest that 
whenever a director exercises his powers for any purpose, be it to distribute 
company money or property or for another purpose, the director's' motives 
must be assessed subjectively as well.118 This assessment must be made: 
"in comparison to other directors carrying out the same functions in relation 
to the company as those carried out by that director with the same general 
knowledge, skill and experience as the director in question."119 In other 
words, courts have a responsibility to make a value judgment in terms of 
how other directors with similar general knowledge, skill and experience 
would have conducted themselves. The aim is to ensure that directors with 
                                            
116  The section states that: (1) a director of a company must exercise reasonable care, 
skill and diligence; (2) this means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised 
by a reasonable person with (a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that 
may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by a 
director in relation to the company, and (b) the general knowledge, skill and 
experience that the director has. This duty is a codification of the common law 
approach and closely resembles the subjective/objective approach applied by Lord 
Hoffman in Norman v Theodore Goddard 1991 BCLC 1028 and In re D'Jan of 
London Ltd 1993 BCC 646. This approach was followed in South Africa in Howard v 
Herrigel 1991 2 SA 660 (A) and Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman; Braitex (Pty) Ltd v 
Snyman 1998 2 SA 138 (SCA). 
117  See City of Cape Town Municipality para 24. 
118  Du Plessis 2010 Acta Juridica 263-289 agrees that s 76(3)(c)(ii) introduces the 
consideration of subjective elements. Also see Du Plessis "Comparative Analysis of 
Directors' Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence in South Africa and in Australia" 263. 
Stevens and De Beer 2016 SA Merc LJ 251-253 discuss the duty of care and skill 
as influenced by English jurisprudence. They express the view that it is generally 
accepted that the common law duty of care and skill was more subjective than 
objective because of the element of "men". But there were also objective elements 
in the inquiry because directors had to act "reasonably" when taking their decisions. 
119  See ss 76(3)(c)(i) and (ii) of the 2008 Act; s 180(1)(a) and (b) of the Corporations 
Act, 2001; s 122(1)(a) of the CBCA; and s 174(1) and (2) of the Companies Act, 
2006. Mongalo argues that the objective standard will apply to the skill and diligence 
only. This is so because the general knowledge, skill and experience requirement as 
provided for under s 76(3)(c) refers to the standard of skill and diligence, and as such 
is not a reference to the standard of care. See Mongalo 2016 JCCL&P 1. Also see 
Du Plessis 2010 Acta Juridica 263. 
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the same skill are compared on an equal footing120 with directors who do 
not have similar skills.  
Previously, Naudé convincingly canvassed for the application of a 
subjective standard of judgment as influenced by English company law 
when reviewing whether directors can be held liable for breach of the duty 
of care, skill and diligence. His thinking was informed by various factors.121 
While du Plessis acknowledges that section 76(3)(c) brings subjective 
elements into court reviews, he also submits that, because South African 
company law has changed since the UK case of City Equitable Fire 
Insurance Co Ltd in 1925 and Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd 
v Jorgensen in 1980, which set the tone for the duty of care and skill in 
South Africa, and has followed international developments in the area of the 
duties of directors, South African courts, as was decided in the Australian 
Daniels v Anderson case, must use modern yardsticks to determine whether 
directors have breached their common law duty of care, skill and diligence 
that will include the principles of the modern law of delict.122 His view is that 
there is no reason in principle, based on policy or on practical 
considerations, why our courts should not move away from the subjective 
standard developed under English courts.123 According to him, the basis of 
liability for the breach of the duty of care, skill and diligence should be the 
principles of the law of delict.124 Richard Stevens and Phillip de Beer seem 
to favour an objective standard of judgment. Arguing on the basis of English 
influence, especially with such cases as Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v 
Stebbing in mind,125 the authors are of the view that since section 76(3)(c) 
appears to have been lifted from the UK Companies Act 2006, South African 
courts should follow the objective standard of judgment adopted by English 
                                            
120  Du Plessis 2010 Acta Juridica 263. 
121  Amongst these were the considerable variation in size of companies; the 
considerable variation of skills which appointed directors possess; the fact that some 
directors are appointed only for their prestige value and others for their knowledge 
of the industry; the fact that some directors literally have no technical know-how of 
the business but are appointed to run the day-to-day business of the company 
anyway. See Naudé Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur 216-217, 230. This 
article was cited in Du Plessis 2010 Acta Juridica 263, whose opinion was that 
Naudé's sentiments were convincing at the time they were made. According to him 
this was so because at the time the standards expected of directors were low and 
the directors' profession was still not well developed and defined as well as the fact 
that the South African law of delict was still relatively ill-developed as far as negligent 
misstatements or misrepresentation causing pure economic loss were concerned. 
122  In making his argument the author quoted extensively from the case. See Du Plessis 
2010 Acta Juridica 263. 
123  Du Plessis 2010 Acta Juridica 263-289. 
124  Du Plessis 2010 Acta Juridica 263-289. 
125  Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing 1989 BCLC 498. 
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courts, which has an upward trajectory in interpreting and/or reviewing the 
duties of directors.126 
It is submitted that it is clear from the provisions of section 76(3)(c)(i) and 
(ii) that the 2008 Act has preferred to take a different path. The section is 
phrased differently from those under the Corporations Act 2001. Hence an 
objective assessment seems the contemplated norm under the 2001 Act.127 
In fact, the position in Australia was very much influenced by the case of 
Daniels v Anderson.128 In that case the court preferred what it termed the 
use of the modern law of negligence to determine whether a director was in 
breach of his duty of care, skill and diligence. The court's view was that the 
modern law of negligence can cope with the potential tension between 
expecting objective professional standards of all directors in all types of 
companies. 
In Visser the court seems to have followed the approach suggested by 
du Plessis. This was surprising as one would have thought that, after the 
court had quoted in full the provisions of section 76(3) of the 2008 Act,129 
it would proceed to analyse these using both the objective and 
subjective standards of judgment. This is especially so given that the 
court failed to recognise subjective elements in interpreting the duty to 
act for proper purpose. Instead the court simply stated that an objective 
test was applicable to determine the duty of proper purpose without 
mentioning the subjective standard.130 The court did not even attempt 
to interrogate the possible application of the subjective standard of 
judgment to the duty of proper purpose by virtue of section 76(3)(c)(i) 
and (ii) of the 2008 Act. In fact, the court said nothing about the section. 
It is submitted that the court erred in not reviewing the actions of the 
directors by inviting subjective elements into its decision by virtue of 
section 76(3)(c)(i) and (ii) of the 2008 Act. Much as du Plessis argues 
for an objective test, he in fact does confirm that section 76(3)(c) does 
not completely objectify directors' duty of care, skill and diligence.131 
                                            
126  Stevens and De Beer 2016 SA Merc LJ 254-255. 
127  In Australia the duty is differently phrased under the Corporations Act, 2001. s 180(1) 
states that: a director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and 
discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person 
would exercise if they (a) were a director or officer of a corporation in the 
corporation's circumstances; and (b) occupied the office held by, and had the same 
responsibilities within the corporation as the director or officer. 
128  Daniels v Anderson 16 ACSR 607 (CA (NSW)) 664-665, from which Jean J du 
Plessis quotes extensively in support of his point: Du Plessis 2010 Acta Juridica 263-
289. 
129  Visser paras 72-73. 
130  Visser para 80. In fact, the court applied different tests at different stages of its 
judgment. For example, para 76 refers to the objective test as applicable to 
determine rationality, while para 74 refers to s 76(4)(a) as subjective. 
131  Du Plessis 2010 Acta Juridica 263-289. 
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The section does not require comparison with a "reasonable person" as 
is the case in Australia, but instead refers to what is "reasonably 
expected of a person".132 To that end, section 76(3)(c) takes a different 
path from that taken by section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001.133 
What the court in Visser turned its attention to and recognised is the 
applicability of the subjective standard of judgment under section 
76(4)(a)(i) based on the words "in the best interests of the company".134 
In quoting the provisions of section 76(3)(c)(i) and (ii) of the 2008 Act, 
the court seemed to have in mind that these provisions were applicable 
to determine the lawfulness of the directors' decision.135 One was 
convinced that this was the proper course which the court was about to 
take because, when looking at the provisions of section 76(3)(c)(i) and 
(ii), the section seems to direct that a subjective test be applied to 
determine the proper purpose for which a power was exercised. 
It is evident that this section is relevant to the performance and exercise 
of powers for the purpose for which they were conferred under the duty 
to act for a proper purpose. The proper purpose for which a decision 
was taken must be determined unambiguously in the context of whether 
the director exercised the power to distribute company money and 
property with the care, skill and diligence reasonably expected of a 
person carrying out the same functions in relation to the company in 
question as those carried out by that director, who has the same general 
knowledge, skill and experience as that director. The proper purpose for 
which the powers were used should therefore not be determined in the 
abstract.136  
                                            
132  See s 43 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984, which is similarly phrased. 
133  Du Plessis 2010 Acta Juridica 263-289. 
134  It stated that s 76(4) makes it clear that the duty imposed by s 76(3)(b) to act 
in the best interests of the company is not objective, in the sense of entitling a 
court, if a board decision is challenged, to determine what is objectively 
speaking in the best interests of the company: "what is required is that the 
directors, having taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed, should 
subjectively have believed that their decision was in the best interests of the 
company and this belief must have had 'a rational basis'." The subjective test 
accords with the conventional approach to directors' duties, which (in relation 
to share transfers) was stated thus by Lord Greene MR in Re Smith & Fawcett 
Ltd supra …". See Visser para 74; Stevens 2016 TSAR 709-730; Stevens and 
De Beer 2016 SA Merc LJ 250-284 for how the principle of rationality applies. 
135  Visser para 72. 
136  In South Africa the fact that a director must observe the duty of care, skill and 
diligence has since been accepted as part of our law as influenced by cases such 
as In re Brazilian Rubber Plantation and Estates Ltd 1911 1 Ch 425; and In re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd 1925 1 Ch 407. A director was expected to exercise 
the care which can reasonably be expected of a person of his knowledge and 
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It is therefore submitted that under the 2008 Act a subjective as well as an 
objective standard of judgment are unambiguously the standards 
contemplated to be applied to establish whether or not a director acted for 
a proper purpose when distributing company money or property. The four-
stage test referred to earlier will therefore be an aid in determining whether 
a director used the power for its conferred proper purpose during the 
process which led to the distributive decision. The duty to act for a proper 
purpose is pervasive. The purpose for the directors' decision will be decisive 
in determining if indeed the decision was proper in the circumstances of the 
case, given the nature of the power conferred upon them. Proper 
documentation of the detailed analysis of the reasons for the decision as 
well as of the legal advice obtained will feature prominently in detemining 
whether the decision was taken for a proper purpose. Where directors are 
not acquainted with the operations of the company to be protected under 
the business judgment rule, they are entitled to rely on other persons as 
provided under section 76(5) of the 2008 Act.137 
If I director has performed his or her' duties for a proper purpose it could 
therefore be deduced, first and foremost, that the director did not exceed 
the limitations of his or her capacity as conferred on him or her by the 
company's MOI.138 More so, it can be said that the director exercised in the 
best interests of the company the care, skill and diligence expected from a 
director with the knowledge, skill and experience befitting a reasonable 
director in the same position and circumstances as the director in question. 
Ensuring that directors exercise their power properly is a necessary 
exercise to undertake to protect investors as well as those who might 
contract with the company.139 This is the reason why the legislature had it 
as a requirement that the objects for which the proposed company was to 
be established must be in the company's memorandum of association, 
                                            
experience. See Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen 1980 4 
SA 156 (W) 166A. 
137  These are one or more employees of the company whom the directors reasonably 
believe to be reliable and competent in the functions performed or the information, 
opinions, reports or statements provided; legal counsel, accountants, or other 
professional persons retained by the company, the board or a committee as to 
matters involving skills or expertise that the directors reasonably believe are matters 
within the particular person's professional or expert competence; or as to which the 
particular person merits confidence; or a committee of the board of which the 
directors are not members, unless the directors have reason to believe that the 
actions of the committee do not merit confidence. 
138  Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 298(1)-(2), citing Naudé 
Regsposisie van die Maatskappyditekteur 111-115. 
139  Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 298(2). 
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which when signed and registered would establish the company.140 The 
principle was established such: 
…objects and purposes foreign to, or inconsistent with, the memorandum of 
association are ultra vires of the corporation itself.141 
Directors commit a breach of trust if they exercise powers which are non-
existent or their actions go beyond the powers conferred on them.142 It is 
irrelevant whether they believe they do so in the best interests of the 
company.143 The issue under the proper purpose is whether the conduct 
impugned is inconsistent with the proper discharge of the duties of the office 
in question.144 All relevant circumstances must be taken into account, 
including the extent of the director's awareness and the financial stability of 
the corporation.145 Whether the action was proper in the circumstances of 
the particular case at the time will be for the court to decide. Directors must 
exercise their powers effectively. For example, when refusing to register 
shares, directors must at all times act bona fide in the best interests of the 
company.146 There must be a formal resolution to that effect, as mere 
inactivity will not suffice.147 
What is telling, though, in the 2008 Act, is that in the definition of a director 
under the Act and/or common law no distinction is drawn between executive 
and non-executive directors.148 This suggests that no distinction shall be 
drawn in the performance of their duties by executive and non-executive 
directors. It is not clear from the 2008 Act, however, whether this also means 
that their level of skills, knowledge, expertise and experience should not be 
distinguished for the purposes of founding liability. This distinction is 
especially potent when it is remembered that the 2008 Act contemplates 
holding directors individually liable for their actions or omissions. The cases 
                                            
140  Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 298(2); Ashbury Railway Carriage 
& Iron Co Ltd v Riche 1875 LR 7 HL 653 678; and Cotman v Brougham 1918 AC 
514 (HL) 522. 
141  Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co Ltd v Riche 1875 LR 7 HL 653 694; Rolled Steel 
Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation 1986 Ch 246 (CA) 295-296, 303-
307. 
142  Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 389; Cullerne v The London & 
Suburban General Permanent Building Society 1890 25 QB 485 (CA) 488, 490; 
Sparks & Young Ltd v John Hoatson 1906 27 NLR 634, 642.  
143  Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 298(2). 
144  As the authors of Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act confirm, if a 
director does not comply with a legal rule, be it in terms of the Act or any other law, 
the director will be in breach of his/her fiduciary duties. Delport et al Henochsberg 
on the Companies Act 296, 298(1); Bester v Wright; Bester v Mouton; Bester v Van 
Greunen 2011 2 All SA 75 (WCC). 
145  Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 298(1). 
146  Visser.  
147  Delport et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 298(1).  
148  Howard v Herrigel 1991 2 SA 660 (A) 678A. 
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discussed above do not deal with this issue. Courts therefore have the need 
to clarify and give direction in this regard. 
6 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the above discussion shows that the duty to act for a 
proper purpose and its regulation still plays a meaningful role in restraining 
directors in the exercise of their powers. Quite a number of divergent views 
have emerged in the above discussion as to which standard of judgment 
should primarily be used to determine whether a particular decision was 
made for a proper purpose in the circumstances of a case. The discussion 
reflects that Australian courts have applied the objective standard of 
judgment based on common law, with the primary purpose test as the norm 
and the preferred standard in determining whether a director acted for a 
proper purpose at a particular time. In Canada, the preferred standards of 
judgment has been both the objective and subjective tests, accompanied by 
the "primary purpose test" and the "causative test". And in the UK both the 
subjective and the objective tests seem to be applied. The different 
approaches are evident in how the courts of these countries have ruled on 
the provisions of the CBCA as well as the Companies Act 2006. 
South African law has also followed the common law approach, preferring 
an objective test accompanied by the "dominant purpose test" instead of the 
subjective test. An argument has been made in this paper that the 2008 Act 
requires the application of both the subjective and objective standards of 
judgment. Having looked at the wording of sections 4(1)(b) and 76(3)(c)(i) 
and (ii) of the 2008 Act, this interpretation seems inevitable. But also, the 
policy direction of the Act as gleaned from its objectives must serve as a 
valuable guide. Overall, it is submitted that what the 2008 Act requires is a 
two-pronged approach to the interpretation of the duty to act for a proper 
purpose. First the duty must be interpreted in terms section 76(3)(a), then 
the latter section must be considered in the context of section 76(3)(c)(i) and 
(ii). To proceed otherwise would be not in the spirit and purposes of the 2008 
Act. 
Ultimately, at all times directors must realise that they are the primary agents 
of the company. They have a constitutional, fiduciary and statutory obligation 
to act with integrity and responsibility for the efficient and responsible 
management of companies. The manner in which they carry out their duties 
is bound to impact significantly on how companies are governed. If directors 
are reliable and sincere in the performance of their obligations, they will 
certainly invigorate and strengthen corporate governance generally. This is 
the reason why directors are accorded protection under the business 
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judgment rule whenever they act prudently. However, if they are not prudent, 
the objectives of corporate governance will not be attained. 
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